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Abstract:
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Dutch and British private corporations were accused of
having aided and abetted in the violation of the human rights of individuals in Nigeria. A
lawsuit, however, was brought in the United States, relying on the Alien Tort Statute—part of
a Judiciary Act from 1789. In its final decision on the case, the US Supreme Court has
strongly focused on ‘territory.’ This usage of a spatial category calls for closer scrutiny of
how the making of legal arguments presupposes ‘spatial knowledge,’ especially in the field of
transnational human rights litigation. Space is hardly a neutral category. What is at stake is
normativity in a global scale with the domestic courtroom turned into a site of spatial
contestation. The paper is interested in the construction of ‘the transnational’ as space, which
implicates a ‘politics of space’ at work underneath the exposed surface of legal
argumentation. The ‘Kiobel situation’ as it unfolded before the Supreme Court is addressed as
example of a broader picture including a variety of contested elements of space: a particular
spatial condition of modern nation-state territoriality; the production of ‘counter-space,’
eventually undermining the spatial regime of inter-state society; and the state not accepting its
withering away. The paper will ask: How are normative boundaries between the involved
jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the ‘politics of space’ work underneath or beyond the
plain moments of judicial decision-making? How territorialized is the legal knowledge at
work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments?
Keywords: Territoriality; Spatial Turn; Transnational Law; Transnational Human Rights
Litigation; Conflict of Laws; Political Theory; Alien Torts Statute; Kiobel.
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Transnational Human Rights Litigation and Territorialized Knowledge:
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Paper forthcoming in Transnational Legal Theory, vol. 5, no.1 (2014)

Abstract:
In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Dutch and British private corporations were
accused of having aided and abetted in the violation of the human rights of individuals
in Nigeria. A lawsuit, however, was brought in the United States, relying on the Alien
Tort Statute—part of a Judiciary Act from 1789. In its final decision on the case, the
US Supreme Court has strongly focused on ‘territory.’ This usage of a spatial category
calls for closer scrutiny of how the making of legal arguments presupposes ‘spatial
knowledge,’ especially in the field of transnational human rights litigation. Space is
hardly a neutral category. What is at stake is normativity in a global scale with the
domestic courtroom turned into a site of spatial contestation. The paper is interested in
the construction of ‘the transnational’ as space, which implicates a ‘politics of space’
at work underneath the exposed surface of legal argumentation. The ‘Kiobel situation’
as it unfolded before the Supreme Court is addressed as example of a broader picture
including a variety of contested elements of space: a particular spatial condition of
modern nation-state territoriality; the production of ‘counter-space,’ eventually
undermining the spatial regime of inter-state society; and the state not accepting its
withering away. The paper will ask: How are normative boundaries between the
involved jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the ‘politics of space’ work underneath
or beyond the plain moments of judicial decision-making? How territorialized is the
legal knowledge at work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments?

On these facts, all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even
where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application. 2
The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction—question it and all that is solid
melts into air. 3
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Dr. Philip Liste, University of Hamburg, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences (Political Science, esp.
Global Governance), Allende-Platz 1, 20146 Hamburg, Email: philip.liste@wiso.uni-hamburg.de.
For insightful critique on earlier versions of the paper, I am grateful to Tanja Aalberts, Fred Aman, Hauke
Brunkhorst, Hannah Buxbaum, Daniel Chernilo, Lauren Coyle, Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Katja Freistein, Alexis
Galan, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Morag Goodwin, Friederike Kuntz, Hans Lindahl, Nick Onuf, Sven Opitz,
Nik Rajkovic, Umut Turem, Wouter Werner, Antje Wiener, Peer Zumbansen and the participants of the Global
Governance Colloquium, August 21, 2013 at University of Hamburg.
2
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491, slip op. (US Supreme Court Apr. 17, 2013) (hereinafter:
Kiobel), 14.
3
Richard T. Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)" (1999) 97 Michigan Law Review 843, 851.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 4 the US Supreme Court has
put transnationalism in its place by strongly relying on the territorial logic of jurisdiction. The
background was an attempt to escape from a Kafkaesque situation caused by abusive
corporate power in the Global South. Royal Dutch Petroleum/Shell was accused of having
aided and abetted in massive violations of human rights in Nigeria. The claims against the
corporations were based on international law—for example, international norms against
extrajudicial killings, crimes against humanity, and torture. None of the alleged violations of
rights did occur in the United States nor was any of the petitioners a US citizen; and none of
the corporations were having their headquarters in the United States. Nonetheless, the
plaintiffs filed their claims against the corporations in a US District Court (Southern District
of New York) relying on the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)—part of a Judiciary Act enacted by the
First Congress of the United States in 1789. This ‘transnational situation’ can thus be said to
transcend space and time. The Supreme Court has now decided that the claims that have been
put forward by the petitioners do not ‘touch and concern the territory of the United States [...]
with sufficient force’. 5 The previous judgment of the Court of Appeals of the 2nd Circuit 6 that
had rejected the case in 2010 was thus affirmed.
In this paper I assume that space is not a neutral category, not an objective fact. The
making of any legal arguments presupposes a spatial knowledge that had become a critical
matter of controversy in the field of transnational human rights litigation. What is at stake is

4

Kiobel.
Kiobel, p. 14.
6
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010). For the case history: United States District Court
Southern District of New York, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al., 02 Civ. 7618 (KMW) ( HBP),
Order, Sep 29, 2006; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (U.S. Court of App., 2nd Cir. 2010);
Oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al.,
Washington, D.C., Feb 28, 2012 < http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/101491.pdf >; Oral argument (Reargument) before the Supreme Court of the United States, Kiobel, et al. v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., Washington, D.C., Oct 1, 2012 < http://argument_transcripts/10-1491rearg.pdf >.
5
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normativity in a global scale whereas the domestic courtroom is turned into the site of spatial
contestation. Although the decision on Kiobel is arguably a moment of juridico-political
gravity, with critical repercussions for the future possibilities of suing transnational
corporations before US courts, the core interest of this paper is not primarily ‘juridical.’ The
major interest is on the construction of ‘the transnational’ as space which implicates a
‘politics of space’ at work underneath the exposed surface of legal argumentation.
This struggle for spatial normativity, however, should not be taken as another
dichotomous deployment of ‘the national’ vs. ‘the global’ in the sense of a globalization
literature suffering from a binary conceptualization of the state on the one hand and a global
society on the other. 7 Even in the global scale, the everyday politics of the production of
space operates in various sites, from international to sub-national settings. The ‘Kiobel
situation’ as it unfolded before the Supreme Court fits nicely in this frame of locally contested
global normativity. In this paper, Kiobel is thus addressed as example of a perhaps broader
picture including a variety of contested spatial elements: a spatial condition of modern nationstate territoriality; the production of ‘counter-space’, 8 eventually undermining the spatial
regime of inter-state society; and the state (in a broad sense) not accepting its withering
away. 9 The paper will question the production of normative space in the field of transnational
human rights litigation. More specifically it will ask: How are normative boundaries between
the involved jurisdictional spaces drawn? How do the ‘politics of space’ work underneath or
beyond the moments of judicial gravity? In other words, how territorialized is the legal
knowledge at work and how does territoriality work in legal arguments?
Although finally decided in a highly territorialized way, Kiobel has up to this point
caused enormous trouble. When starting from a nation-state paradigm, the mere possibility of
7

For the criticism, see Saskia Sassen, “Neither Global nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority
and Rights” (2008) 1 Ethics & Global Politics 61.
8
Henri Lefebvre, “The State in the Modern World (1975)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds) State, Space,
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 117.
9
Henri Lefebvre, “The Worldwide Experience (1978)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds) State, Space,
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 278.
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suing non-US private corporations for human rights violations in whatever places of the world
before US courts can be said to be subversive. Kiobel, by representing the putative
possibilities of the ATS, implicated a somehow disturbing ‘worldness’. 10
Before I can analyze how spatial politics are at work in the recent Supreme Court
decision, I will first review a body of work in the social sciences including legal studies that is
inspired by insights in critical geography and ask how in particular the field of transnational
law has taken up this ‘philosophy of social space’ 11 (section 2). Taking up the concept of
‘little nothings’, 12 I will argue that critical reconfigurations of space do happen underneath the
surface of exposed legal arguments. The focus will thus have to be shifted to what in
following International Relations scholar Jef Huysmans I call ‘little litigation nothings’
(section 3). The analysis will then illustrate how in Kiobel territoriality was weighted
remarkably high by juxtaposing the Supreme Court majority’s spatial mode of production
with ‘counter-spaces’ as raised in the concurring opinion by Justice Breyer (section 4).
Finally, I will end with a cursory evaluation of what Kiobel may mean to social space (section
5).

2. LEGAL TERRITORIALITIES AS SOCIAL SPACE
Since 1980 and the groundbreaking Filàrtiga case, 13 human rights litigation cases
have been brought to US courts by using the ATS which was enacted already in 1789 and
holds that ‘[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’. 14

10

ibid.
David Harvey, “The Sociological and Geographical Imaginations” (2005) 18 International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 211, 213.
12
See Jef Huysmans, “What's in an Act? On Security Speech Acts and Little Security Nothings” (2011) 42
Security Dialogue 371.
13
Filàrtiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (U.S. Court of App., 2nd Cir. 30 June 1980) (hereinafter Filàrtiga).
14
28 U.S.C. § 1350. Corresponding ATS lawsuit are: Filàrtiga; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)
(hereinafter: Sosa); Roe v. Bridgestone, 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2007); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 744 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Ind.
11
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Hence, the ATS provides a critical interface of international law and domestic jurisprudence,
no matter what substance international law had in the late 18th century. 15 As such interface the
ATS has been embraced particularly by various human rights advocates in order to sue private
corporations for their involvement in diverse atrocities in the Global South, with Kiobel
eventually being the most prominent—and perhaps sudden end point—of these lawsuits on
abusive corporate power.

Territoriality
When understood as a signpost to an emerging transnational constellation,
transnational litigation may indeed challenge the base lines of an inter-state world order with
territoriality as its major principle. Taking this as a starting point, analysis could move
towards various directions. First, the territoriality of an international normative order could be
taken for granted, like a vast body of work in IR has done for decades. 16 The primary concern
would then be on the ’natural’ limits of transnational human rights litigation and whether or
not corresponding transnational legal strategies may someday succeed. Likewise the question
could be raised as to how human rights could (or should) be enforced against the background

2010); and Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 642 F.3d 1013 (2011). This script for the transnational legal
process, to be clear, stems from the late 18th century and even precedes Immanuel Kant’s seminal remark on the
idea of a Weltbürgerrecht (cosmopolitan condition): “Da es nun mit der unter den Völkern der Erde einmal
durchgängig überhand genommenen (engeren und oder weiteren) Gemeinschaft so weit gekommen ist, daß die
Rechtsverletzung an einem Platz der Erde von allen gefühlt wird: so ist die Idee eines Weltbürgerrechts keine
phantastische und überspannte Vorstellungsart des Rechts, sonder eine notwendige Ergänzung des
ungeschriebenen Kodex, sowohl des Staats- als Völkerrechts zum öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt, und
so zum ewigen Frieden, zu dem man sich der kontinuierlichen Annäherung zu befinden nur unter dieser
Bedingung schmeicheln darf.” (Immanuel Kant, "Schrift Zum Ewigen Frieden," in Wilhelm Weischedel (ed)
Werkausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1964 [1795]), 216-17).
15
See Filàrtiga, 881 (‘Thus it is clear that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it
has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.’).
16
For the prototypical canon, see Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Robert O. Keohane, “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge
After the Cold War”, in David A. Baldwin (ed) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberal International Relations Theory: A
Scientific Assessment”, in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds) Progress in International Relations
Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003), 159; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 1979). For early criticisms, see John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing
Modernity in International Relations”, International Organization 47 (1993), 139-174; R.B.J. Walker,
Inside/Outside International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
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of an international regime of territoriality. Second, the challenge of transnational litigation
could be taken for granted, e.g. as a now given phenomenon of globalization that the world of
nation-states would have to cope with. The major concern would then be on normative order
in the global realm. The question would be what normative changes may be caused or how a
normative order touched by phenomena of transnational human rights litigation would look
like. The assumption in this paper, however, is that these two views can hardly be separated.
Both views relate to each other in highly productive ways; and I argue that ‘the political’
comes in with this inter-relatedness. The aim is thus to extrapolate the social productivity of
the very relation between taken-for-granted territoriality and taken-for-granted phenomena of
globalization.
Following a now remarkable body of work emphasizing the spatiality of state, substate, and non-state politics, 17 such phenomena of contested normativity as contested space—
and I see transnational litigation as one such phenomenon—can hardly be understood as
operating against the background of an eternally fixed and externally given regime of
territoriality. Rather, the meaning of territory or space turns into a matter of controversy.
Following insights inspired by critical geography, 18 space and territoriality cannot be treated
as given but must be understood as contingent, i.e. as result of a history of territorial fixes,

17

John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumption of International Relations Theory” (1994)
1 Review of International Political Economy 53; John Agnew, “Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of
World Politics” (2007) 1 International Political Sociology 138; Neil Brenner, and Stuart Elden, “Henri Lefebvre
on State, Space, Territory” (2009) 3 International Political Sociology 353; Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden,
“Introduction. State, Space, World: Lefebvre and the Survival of Capitalism” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden
(eds), State, Space, World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Saskia Sassen, “Neither Global
nor National: Novel Assemblages of Territory, Authority and Rights” (2008) 1 Ethics & Global Politics 61;
Nisha Shah, “The Territorial Trap of the Territorial Trap: Global Transformation and the Problem of the State's
Two Territories” (2012) 6 International Political Sociology 57; Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta,
“Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in an Age of Globalization” in Aradhana Sharma and Akhil
Gupta (eds), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006), 1.
18
Michel Foucault, “Questions on Geography”, in Michel Foucault (ed.), Power/Knowledge (transl. by C.
Gordon) (New York: Pantheon, 1980); Michel Foucault, “Of Other Spaces” (1986) 16 Diacritics 22; David
Harvey, Social Justice and the City (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1973); Harvey, “The
Sociological and Geographical Imaginations”; Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Malden, MA:
Blackwell, 1991); Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social
Theory (London: Verso, 1989).
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socially constructed in an ongoing social process. Criticism like that of the ‘territorial trap’, 19
‘methodological nationalism’, 20 or a state-centered ‘obstacle épistemologique’ 21 mark a
fundamental engagement with eventually problematic categories. John Agnew has
insightfully phrased this epistemological moment as ‘geographies of knowledge’. 22 By
knowledge, as he himself defines, he means ‘explanatory schemes, frames of reference,
crucial sets of assumptions, narrative traditions, and theories’. 23 Geographical knowledge
does underlie any practice relevant in the ongoing reproduction of space and place. In fact, the
mere imagination of political rule as territorially fixed affects what forms of governance are
conceivable and what not. The epistemological configuration of space matters because
geographical knowledge is necessary for the legitimization of power. 24 Hence, governance
agencies like those of the state are deeply involved in the production of space. They create the
space in which their legitimacy unfolds.
Socially constructed space, in other words, serves a purpose—and is produced for
particular purposes. 25 Space can thus no longer be understood as a physically given
precondition of governmental formations but becomes itself subject to governance practice. 26
To analyze such ‘uses of space’ as meaningful for political, legal, economic or other social
purposes, it is necessary to rely on practice, that is, practice of rendering space meaningful in
particular ways. Borrowing from anthropological work, I will call this practice knowledge

19

John Agnew, “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumption of International Relations Theory”.
Ulrich Beck, Macht Und Gegenmacht Im Globalen Zeitalter: Neue Weltpolitische Ökonomie (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp, 2002), ch. II.
21
Gunther Teubner, "Fragmented Foundations: Social Constitutionalism Beyond the Nation State," in Petra
Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010),
328.
22
John Agnew, “Know-Where: Geographies of Knowledge of World Politics”.
23
Ibid.: 138.
24
Shah, “The Territorial Trap of the Territorial Trap: Global Transformation and the Problem of the State's Two
Territories”, 60.
25
Lefebvre, The Production of Space.
26
See Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”.
20
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practice; 27 and since this paper is concerned with litigation and the production of space, I am
particularly interested in spatial knowledge practice.
As the political space of modern nation-state territoriality is entangled within a
particular—and historically contingent 28—form of governance, spatial practice may affect the
state. The reproduction of political space turns into a practice of governance itself and relates
to what may be called a spatial strategy. 29 Thus understood, transcending the form of
governance typical of the system of sovereign nation-states can be understood as a form of
resistance against an established regime of space 30 or, to take up a concept of Henri Lefebvre,
a ‘state mode of production [mode de production etatique]’. 31 While the practice of filing
transnational lawsuits in domestic courts (in the US) could then be analyzed as a resistant
spatial strategy, corresponding practices of sustaining the territorialized state mode of
production would be a counter-strategy. The State, as Lefebvre puts it, ‘will not let itself
wither away or be overcome without resistance’, 32 whereas ‘the state’ should here not be
understood in a narrow sense only as state government. 33 The territoriality of the state finds
itself confronted with a commonsensical state of territoriality, reproduced through a variety of
different actors. In this paper, the courtroom will be focused as the site of corresponding
spatial struggles—resistance and perpetuation.

Law and Space
27

Annelise Riles, “Anthropology, Human Rights, and Legal Knowledge: Culture in the Iron Cage” (2006) 108
American Anthropologist 52.
28
Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”; Boaventura de
Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law”, 14 Journal of Law and
Society 279 (1987).
29
Brenner and Elden, “Introduction: State, Space World: Lefebvre and the Survival of Capitalism”, 33; Henri
Lefebvre, “Reflections on the Politics of Space (1970)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds), State, Space,
World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 180.
30
See Henri Lefebvre, “The Worldwide and the Planetary (1973)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds), State,
Space, World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 204.
31
Henri Lefebvre, “Space and the State (1978)” in Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (eds), State, Space, World
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 226.
32
Lefebvre, “The Worldwide Experience (1978),” 278.
33
See Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” in
Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta (eds) The Anthropology of the State: A Reader (Malden: Blackwell, 2006).
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Speaking in terms of legal knowledge, we can now argue that practice like the making
of international legal treaties is only rendered intelligible (or knowable) against the
background of a particular kind of geographical knowledge, that is, an inter-state normative
paradigm. In turn, the international legal conduct of states can be understood as a knowledge
practice that reproduces this inter-state paradigm. Despite the perhaps internationalist
orientation of its protagonists, the ‘esprit d’internationalité’, 34 international law builds upon a
highly territorialized knowledge of the world. 35 Notably, things may be different with
transnational law. I assume that transnational legal practice may (but not necessarily must)
further an alternative body of spatial knowledge. A major concern of this paper is thus to
establish a research framework for analyzing the production of transnational law’s space.
Before this argument can be unfolded it is necessary to elaborate the nexus between
territory and law or the spatial moment of jurisdiction, respectively. Though not extending his
consideration to the fields of international or transnational relations, a remarkable advance has
been established by Richard Ford in his ‘Law’s Territory’. 36 Ford’s spatial argument parallels
the above considered work on the geographical knowledge upon which governance (or in
Ford’s case: government) bases. ‘The logic of government is the logic of jurisdiction—
question it and all that is solid melts into air’. 37 With respect to the territoriality of
jurisdictional claims, Ford convincingly suggests to understand jurisdiction as discourse or
social practice, 38 respectively. This is not to say, as he moves on, that jurisdictional lines are
not ‘real’ but, in fact, they have to be ‘made real’ 39 by applying the law, e.g. in the daily
administrative process or by determining its reach in the course of juridical decision-making.

Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13.
35
Karen Knop, “Statehood: Territoty, People, Government,” in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds)
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
36
Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)".
37
Ibid.: 851.
38
Ibid.: 855.
39
Ibid.: 856.
34
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What is important is that we are concerned with just another—now legal—dimension
of the constructed reality of governance. ‘Lines on a map may anticipate jurisdiction, but a
jurisdiction itself consists of the practices that make the abstract space depicted on a map
significant’. 40 The determination of jurisdictional boundaries, of the law’s territory, to take up
Ford’s title, consists in an everyday legal practice of such signification. 41 What works well for
the political deployment of geographical knowledge as a means of governance, does also
work for jurisdiction—in the sense of a spatial politics of law. Whether and how different
things or individuals are (or become) subject to regulation depends on how jurisdiction is
framed. Thus understood, jurisdiction is but a technology of governance. 42
The framework provided by Ford can easily be extended to the global realm where
jurisdiction though organized along the lines of nation-state boundaries for centuries is
contested and national jurisdiction finds itself challenged by legal practice, especially with
respect to universal jurisdiction. 43 Hence, as technology jurisdiction is also applied in the
global realm, in various social settings and times. The political moment of this can hardly be
formulated smarter as through the final words of Ford’s insightful piece:
The history of space and spaces offers a rogue’s gallery of cartographers, imperialists,
merchant adventurers, medieval rulers, town constables, urban visionaries, architects,
judges and jurists. But in all these there are only protagonists, no heroes. The heroes
and heroines, perhaps, are yet to come. 44

It could be added that an evolving transnational space may be their stage. That said,
the questions can be raised what a ‘transnational space’ is, how it comes into being, and what
role legal practice plays in that process.
40

Ibid.
For a useful concept of signification, see Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London and New York: Verso, 2001). For a concept of the
‘everyday,’ see Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (translated by Steven F. Rendall) (Berkeley:
University of Californial Press, 1988).
42
See Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)," 867.
43
See William J. Aceves, “Liberalism and International Legal Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move
Towards a Universal System of Transnational Law Litigation” (2000) 41 Harvard International Law Journal
129; Wolfgang Kaleck, “From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008” (2009) 30
Michigan Journal of International Law 927.
44
Ford, "Law's Territory (a History of Jurisdiction)," 930.
41
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Transnational Space
The term transnational law has been introduced into legal studies in the 1950s by
Philip Jessup who used it in order to ‘include all law which regulates actions or events that
transcend national frontiers’. 45 ‘Transnational situations,’ as Jessup held, ‘may involve
individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups’. 46 Facing such
multiplicity of actors beyond the confines of the territorial state, a clear-cut demarcation of
domestic and international legal spheres can hardly be upheld. Transnational situations may
indeed challenge the inter-state paradigm—not only with respect to legal relations.
More recently, Harold Koh relies on the ‘transnational legal process’ in order to
explain state compliance with international law. The argument is that international law is
already operating on various sub-state levels in such a way that state governments are no
longer free in their decision to opt out. The ‘[t]ransnational legal process,’ as Koh puts it,
describes the theory and practice of how public and private actors—nation-states,
international organizations, multinational enterprises, non-governmental
organizations, and private individuals—interact in a variety of public and private,
domestic and international fora to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize
rules of transnational law. 47

While neither interest-based nor identity-based theories would provide convincing
answers to the compliance puzzle, Koh assumes that it is the repeated interaction of a variety
of actors within the nation-state but also across state boundaries that generates a situation in
which breaches of international would cause frictions. 48 A network of legal interactions across
national boundaries does also play a decisive role in the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter who
holds that various state agencies would increasingly cooperate across boundaries with their

Jessup, Transnational Law, 2.
Ibid., 3.
47
Harold Hongju Koh, “Transnational Legal Process” (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181, 183-4.
48
ibid., 203-4.
45
46
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foreign counterparts. While this narrative of what Slaughter calls a ‘New World Order’ 49
indeed involves the development of border-transcending governance networks, the focus
remains on state actors though ‘disaggregated’ in their sovereignty. 50 Slaughter’s account can
thus be considered ‘trans-governmental’ rather that ‘transnational.’
Facing the transnational challenges of law, some legal scholars have also relied on the
global or transnational realm as space. Proponents of the Global Administrative Law (GAL)
project argue
that current circumstances call for recognition of a global administrative space,
distinct from the space of inter-state relations governed by international law and the
domestic regulatory space governed by domestic administrative law, although
encompassing elements of each. 51

What is coming to the fore in this passage is that the mentioned ‘global administrative
space’—as now being ‘recognized’—is in need of regulation, that is, a particular kind of
regulation which emancipates itself from the nation-state constitutional bonds though taking
up impulses from ‘administrative law.’ But we should be aware that this is a normative
argument since the GAL approach takes for granted that regulatory space—including its
particular needs of being governed—is already there. What is neglected is that the practice of
(global) administration, in turn, also affects (or even creates) space. GAL already implicates a
certain normative order which is axiomatically set beyond the approach’s theoretical
reflection. GAL, in other words, lacks a theoretical account on power, i.e. a theory of how
space comes into being by way of everyday politico-legal practice. In so doing, the approach
is by no means less ‘normative’ than the constitutionalist accounts criticized by GAL as too
wide-ranging in a normative sense. 52
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Some global 53 or transnational 54 legal pluralists have indeed offered a more
sophisticated account of transnational space. While in part, ‘transnational space’ is used as a
rather empty label, 55 Paul Schiff Berman by relying on insights in the field of critical
geography criticizes that ‘although the social and political construction of space is a
fundamental aspect of legal ordering, the constructed nature of the enterprise disappears from
analytical purview’. 56 Instead of elaborating the nexus of the construction of space and legal
ordering, however, the argument widely circles around the concept of ‘community’.
Paralleling the ‘imagined community’ argument by Benedict Anderson, 57 Berman takes issue
with the detaining of community in the nation-state. The particular modes how community is
constructed and how the practice of community-building relates to law, however, remain
underdeveloped—although this would be the crucial point. While this criticism on setting the
nation-state as the natural space for community is indeed an important requisite for doing
away with the ‘state-based focus of international law’, 58 the arguments of a constructed nature
of things, as well as, the objectification of communal and/ or legal knowledge are not fully
exhausted. In the end, community building is ‘transnational’ when transcending the
boundaries of the nation state. The more far reaching claim in line with insights in critical
geography, 59 however, would be to say that building community would mean to create space,
i.e. the construction of community and the production of space will always go hand in hand.
The notion of a constructed community alone cannot provide satisfying answers to how law
and space are interrelated.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Antje Wiener, Anthony F Jr Lang, James Tully, Miguel P
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While implicating a similar criticism, Peer Zumbansen in a number of articles
proposes a ‘methodological’ approach to ‘the transnational’: It is not the ‘extension of […]
normativity across borders’ that the term transnational points to. 60 ‘Instead,’ as Zumbansen
holds,
the term transnational identifies an intricate connection of spatial and conceptual
dimensions: in addressing, on the one hand, the demarcation of emerging and evolving
spaces and, on the other, the construction of these spaces as artifacts for human
activity, communication and rationality, the term transnational is conceptual. To
declare an activity as being transnational is not just the result of an empirical
observation. 61

What is at issue is but the productivity of transnational observations. The critical
question is thus how we can know a transnational constellation when seeing it. Put differently,
observing ‘the transnational’ already implies certain preconditions. By describing an
interaction as transnational we already assume—i.e. construct—a certain space where this
interaction takes place. Using the term ‘methodology,’ however, does not prompt
clarification. The crucial question is one of epistemology—how we are able to know the
transnational—and Zumbansen rightly holds that we cannot know by just recognizing a social
interaction as crossing nation-state borders. 62 In fact, the interesting moment is not the
crossing of jurisdictional boundaries itself but the way how the meaning of such bordercrossing phenomena is conceived and determined. Kiobel, as will be illustrated below, is a
nice example of how spatial meaning is produced. Since transnational law—now understood
as such epistemological practice—may consist in the creation of its own operational space,
knowledge provided in the course of the transnational legal process generates ‘truth’.
Transnational law, when understood as spatial knowledge practice is to be conceived as
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highly political because as practice it immediately affects the knowledge-power nexus and
contributes to generating a régime du savoir. 63 To take this ‘political moment’ of spatial
knowledge into account a framework of analysis must remain open for discursive
interventions putting transnational law in charge as means for whatever ends. In principle, this
could include both, spatial resistance as well as a perpetuation of the established ‘state mode
of production’. 64 Transnational law is to be understood as a technique of spatial production, 65
and is thus deeply involved in a politics of space.
This is the broader frame in which this paper seeks to analyze the production of space
in the course of transnational human rights litigation. If the ‘domestic’ courtroom becomes
(or: is transformed into) a site where the production of space is ‘negotiated’ by means of
transnational law, the dense and historically congealed link between territoriality and
jurisdiction 66 and thus the established demarcations between national and international
affairs, as well as, between public and private forms of governance 67 are made subject to
highly contested legal knowledge practice.
In this respect, the aim is to put the phenomenon of transnational human rights
litigation in broader perspective. It cannot be taken for granted that transnational law is but a
manifestation of a globalized world. In the process of transnational litigation different
actors—petitioners and respondents, as well as, sympathizers of either of the two sides—may
use ‘transnational law’ for different purposes like the perpetuation of jurisdictional state
boundaries, the establishment of universal jurisdiction, or the exclusion of private enterprise
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from public (legal) regulation. 68 The dichotomist assumption of ‘national jurisdiction and the
state’ vs. ‘transnational legal process as globalization’ would be like tapping into the
‘territorial trap’ 69 while walking along the legal path. In order to remain open for actual
(legal) relations of production, analyses may not reproduce the zero-sum imaginary of more
globalization and less state. 70

3. LITTLE LITIGATION NOTHINGS
The recent Supreme Court decision on Kiobel significantly cuts future possibilities to
sue human rights violators before US courts, particularly when the relevant conduct occurred
on the territory of a foreign sovereign. While human rights advocates criticize the decision as
disappointing, 71 those speaking in the name of private business hail the judicial strengthening
of the state. 72 In fact, the decision points to an exclusion of private conduct beyond the
jurisdictional boundaries of the Unites States from being adjudicated through US courts, even
when massive violations of human rights are at issue. But at the same time this exclusion is
achieved only by way of a perpetuation of nation-state boundaries: transnational private
governance goes hand-in-hand with ‘modern’—perhaps ‘post-modern’—nation-state practice.
Although the decision on Kiobel can be understood as a moment of juridico-political
‘gravity’, the mentioned spatial issues are somehow ‘subliminal,’ i.e. not present on the
surface of legal argumentation. A mainly ‘legal’ analysis of the decision, however, risks
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veiling the micro-politics at work in everyday legal knowledge practices. While true,
territoriality was weighted remarkably high in the Supreme Court’s Kiobel decision, debate is
rather focusing on future possibilities of litigation, not the spatial repercussions of the case. 73
But it is this latter moment that interests me from a social science perspective. It is this latter
perspective on global normativity that puts the ‘workings of geographies of knowledge’ 74 on
the agendas of an empirical engagement with transnational law. The (global) regulation of
world society operates in a variety of (local) sites—a ‘good part of globalization consists of an
enormous variety of subnational micro-processes’ 75—with the domestic courtroom as one of
these sites.
In sum, the underlying idea is to analyze Kiobel with respect to how territoriality and
space are constructed, i.e. whether and how taken positions are built upon bodies of
territorialized knowledge and how these positions, in turn, contribute to the regime of space.
To this end, Kiobel is deployed analytically as the site to observe a legal politics of space at
work. Being inspired by Jef Huysmans’ concept of ‘little security nothings,’ I switch the focus
to little litigation nothings—’devices, sites, practices without exceptional significance’. 76 In
so doing, I also follow a stream of ‘ethnographic’ work on inter- or transnational relations as
outlined, inter alia, in early feminist studies in IR (in the late 1980s). 77 Culminating in the
slogan that ‘the personal is international’, 78 Cynthia Enloe argues that ‘we can acquire a more
realistic understanding of how international politics actually “works”’ 79 by analyzing politics
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beyond the visible international situations like international meetings of the (mostly male)
heads of states.
While Kiobel is considered a landmark decision, exceptional in a way, the territorial
patterns at work are not the exposed matter of attention. The little litigation nothings, it is now
argued, do the reproductive work on the meaning of jurisdictional space and/ or the spatial
knowledge of law, respectively. The core analytical assumption is that legal arguments,
though not necessarily intended to reproduce social space, tend to take on a life of their own.
It is thus not the substance of a legal argument but the way how these arguments are used as a
‘crucial technology’ of the ‘legal infrastructure’ 80 that tells us a lot about the political moment
of transnational litigation. By analyzing one transnational legal process with respect to such
little litigation nothings I do, at the same time, propose a type of analysis that focuses on the
everyday life of ‘the transnational.’ It is only this perspective on the little litigation nothings
rendering the hidden politics of space visible.

4. KIOBEL: THE SPATIAL POLITICS OF LAW AT WORK
In Kiobel, a politics of space became most obvious when the Supreme Court in March
2012 switched the focus from the question of corporate liability to territoriality. 81 While the
Appeals Court of the 2nd Circuit had rejected the Kiobel case for reasons of corporate liability
(or non-liability, to be clear), 82 the Supreme Court, after having heard oral arguments in
February 2012, invited the parties for another round of ‘rearguments,’ focusing on the
question of ‘Whether and under what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute allows courts to
recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory
of a sovereign other than the United States.’ In the judgment, the court widely concentrates on
this spatial dimension of the case—while, at the same time, treating the questions of corporate
See Riles, Collateral Knowledge: Legal Reasoning in the Global Financial Markets, 45.
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82
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2010).
80
81

19

liability and the substance of international law to be applied under the ATS as rather
peripheral. Space, in other words, was chosen as the very core of the case.
By more or less replicating the mentioned question for the rearguments session, the
court points out in the decision that ‘[t]he question presented is whether and under what
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute, for
violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States’. 83 In the opinion, the principle of the presumption against extraterritorial
application—that is, a principle that US law shall not be applied beyond the state borders—
was introduced as a ‘natural’ limit to ATS litigation. ‘That canon,’ as the court’s majority put
it, ‘provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it
has none”’. 84 In general, the rationale behind the presumption is to prevent interferences of
US law into the sovereignty of foreign states. No doubt, the claims brought against Royal
Dutch Petroleum/ Shell possess such extraterritorial reach. The question was thus whether
there is something in the ATS that would rebut the presumption. 85 The majority’s answer
was: No. ‘The ATS covers actions by aliens for violations of the law of nations, but that does
not imply extraterritorial reach—such violations affecting aliens can occur either within or
outside the United States’. 86
Although being an interface between international law and domestic jurisprudence, the
extraterritorial reach of the statute is not acknowledged. The ATS is interpreted as falling
short of giving a ‘clear indication of an extraterritorial application’. 87 The question can be
posed, however, whether the absence of a ‘clear indication’ really is that clear. Indeed, diverse
objections to the majority’s reasoning of the decision were raised. ‘The ATS,’ as Justice
Breyer holds, ‘was enacted with “foreign matters” in mind. The statute’s text refers explicitly
Kiobel, 1.
Kiobel, 4.
85
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to “alien[s],” “treat[ies],” and “the law of nations”’. 88 And by relying on the judgment in the
Sosa case, 89 he argues that ‘at least one of the three kinds of activities that we found to fall
within the statute’s scope, namely piracy […] normally takes place abroad’. 90 Against the
backdrop of these alternatives, the argumentative path chosen by the majority is hardly as
self-evident as it is presented. Thus understood, the ATS although ‘bringing international law
home’, 91 falls short of transcending national territoriality. In order to make this a case, the
court pursues a ‘politics of space.’
The spatial moment in the Supreme Court decision, strangely enough, finds an
expression in the way how Kiobel is related to piracy. In the historical record of
jurisprudence, piracy was brought up as a possible target of ATS litigation, 92 so that today
there is hardly any doubt that pirates would be liable under the statute. But what do pirates
have to do with human rights violations through private corporations? In fact, piracy was
discussed with regard to the question of corporate liability. While despite the sometimes
obviously abusive conduct of private corporations it would be difficult to argue that
corporations act like pirates, a parallelization of conduct of pirates and corporations is
interesting from a legal point of view: since pirates clearly pursue an economic objective they
may indeed be ‘like’ corporations. As a result, the argument could be raised that if pirates are
liable under the ATS, so are corporations. 93
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But piracy stayed an issue, even after the court had switched the focus to
territoriality—perhaps even as a hidden (‘invisibilized’) Achilles’ heel in the court majority’s
opinion. The reason for this is that piracy, no doubt, has an extraterritorial dimension. While it
seems to be established that pirates would be liable under the ATS and, at the same time, the
extraterritorial dimension of piracy is taken for granted, it is eventually inconsistent to say that
the ATS has no extraterritorial reach. Acknowledging the right under international law to
seize pirates in whatever place may not be compatible with saying that nothing in the ATS
would rebut the extraterritorial presumption.
Applying U. S. law to pirates, however, does not typically impose the sovereign will
of the United States onto conduct occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of
another sovereign […]. Pirates […] generally did not operate within any jurisdiction.
[…] We do not think that the existence of a cause of action against them is a sufficient
basis for concluding that other causes of action under the ATS reach conduct that does
occur within the territory of another sovereign; pirates may well be a category unto
themselves. 94

In fact, pirates are made a ‘category unto themselves’ within this passage by being
located somewhere beyond territorial jurisdiction, i.e. in a non-space. Piracy is deterritorialized. That productive determination, however, is hardly without any alternative.
‘The majority,’ as Justice Breyer puts it,
cannot wish this piracy example away by emphasizing that piracy takes place on the
high seas […]. That is because the robbery and murder that make up piracy do not
normally take place in the water; they take place on a ship. And a ship is like land, in
that it falls within the jurisdiction of the nation whose flag it flies. 95

And that would of course, as Breyer continues, ‘typically involve applying our law to
acts taking place within the jurisdiction of another sovereign.’ 96 The issue at stake is, in other
words, how to locate piracy in a normative space. Piracy is spatially signified and thus
ascribed with a certain spatial meaning that, in turn, generates an Achilles’ heel of the legal
argument. The majority’s construction of piracy while operating in a normative non-space
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contributes to the plausibility of the whole spatial story that is put forward with the decision.
Since pirates are granted a certain position in the record of ATS jurisprudence, locating their
activity on another sovereign’s territory would undermine the ‘extraterritorial presumption’
argument. In sum, piracy is not a mere sideshow. The spatial construction of piracy as a
‘category unto themselves’ rather contributes to a productive spatial narrative and is thus
brought up as a decisive tool in the rejection of the case.
As a result, the Kiobel decision curtails the scope for future human rights suits against
transnational private corporations remarkably. The role which the underlying spatial
knowledge plays becomes highly obvious in the last passages of the opinion. In the text, limits
to future lawsuits against corporations are particularly established through an emphasis on the
relation between corporative conduct and the territory of the United States.
And even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application […]. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach
too far to say that mere corporate presence suffices.97

With regard to the future scope of legal possibilities one could raise the argument that
the court has left things in the dark. 98 The ‘touch and concern’ formula is setting a fluid
criterion. While the mere corporate presence on US territory is now said to be an insufficient
relation, this would not per se preclude creative constructions of inter-relations between space
and conduct in the future. 99 From a social science point of view—and particularly with regard
to the theoretical argument on the production of space—the problem is more fundamental and
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grounds in a problematic spatial circularity of the discussed legal decision. Although deeply
involved in the production of space, the court presents territory as physically given. Territory
is thus ‘naturalized’ and, in so doing, a veil is drawn over the political nature of social space.
The court works with the very notion of territory and space which is so fundamentally
questioned by the literature in the field of critical geography and beyond. In sum, if we
assume that territory is constructed and that legal text like a decision of the US Supreme
Courts participates in an ongoing process of the production of space, the ‘touch and concern’
formula appears in a different light.

5. CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that transnational human rights litigation may cut through
the heart of a territorialized legal knowledge. In order to establish a framework for the critical
analysis of human rights litigation, territory and space have been understood as not physically
given but as constructed in an ongoing social and socio-legal process. Legal practice like in
Kiobel makes sense only against the background of a particular spatial knowledge.
‘Transnational’ jurisprudence is affected because, in the first place, legal practice will have to
make sense of ‘the transnational.’ Put differently, ‘the transnational’ will have to be
constructed as a space within which a certain legal practice makes sense. Since the established
construction of territory has such critical repercussions on how legal arguments can be
developed, territoriality turns into a legal technology.
Where the congealed notion of territorial jurisdiction is questioned, the solid ground of
historically congealed governance structures ‘melts into air’. 100 By borrowing from Marx’ and
Engels’ Manifesto Ford nicely points out how much is at stake where space become a matter
of controversy, even where the spatial moment of controversy is not made too explicit. In this
paper, Kiobel has been understood as a critical site of such contestation. When facing such a
100
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threat to established modes of governance—the state mode of production—state institutions,
like courts, cannot be expected to ‘let itself wither away or be overcome without
resistance’. 101 On the one hand, the Supreme Court’s decision on Kiobel could be interpreted
as such resistant practice in a world of states challenged by globalization. On the other hand,
this interpretation draws on a too broad-brushed narrative of globalization and the state, no
longer (if ever) suitable for depicting global complexity.
By curtailing further possibilities of suing private corporations under the ATS the
Supreme Court has effectively closed a door for transnational human rights litigation and
preserved a certain space for private enterprise in the global realm. While the spatial
restrictions on jurisdiction as reproduced in the Kiobel decision reinforce state boundaries
they also affect the conditions of private enterprise beyond these now reinforced boundaries.
Limiting the jurisdiction of the nation-state means by implication that evolving structures of
private governance in the Global South will not become subject to state regulation. This adds
up to the argument that the state is not a victim of globalization but is itself deeply involved in
the construction of ‘globalized’ space. 102 In turn, transnational private corporations are—
perhaps paradoxically—involved in the preservation of the state and its jurisdictional space.
What emerges is a public-private partnership in its own right, 103 with the result that the
Kafkaesque situation of—in this case Nigerian—individuals not permitted entrance to the law
remains in ‘place.’
The attempt to establish universal jurisdiction can of course be seen as problematic,
for example in the sense of a de facto imperial projection of US jurisdiction to the world.
Likewise, the criticism can be raised with respect to unintended reciprocity. The mere
possibility of courts in other countries deciding on corporate conduct in the US may prompt
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serious doubts. The spatial analysis of Kiobel, however, indicates that if seen as problematic
universal jurisdiction is only problematic for a particular reason: the social construction of
space. Territory is not a natural thing but is in need of being ‘naturalized.’ Universal
jurisdiction is thus not per se problematic but only due to a spatial constellation of jurisdiction
which is subject to a politics of space. ‘There is a politics of space because space is
political’. 104 Because of this political ‘nature’ of space, it is problematic to locate the
transnational legal process per se in a ‘transnational space’ that, as a matter of consequence,
cannot be implicated as already existing. Rather, we find the social—or here: socio-legal—
construction of ‘the transnational’ as space, whereas a controversy arises about how the
meaning of such space is to be determined. While the global human rights community has
hoped to effectively construct ‘the transnational’ as space in such a way that international
human rights norms are superior to territorial jurisdiction, the court has sustained the
established construction of ‘the transnational’ as space with the state as the gatekeeper even
of global law.
“What do you still want to know, then?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.”
“Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is that in these many years no
one except me has requested entry?” The gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying
and, in order to reach his diminishing sense of hearing, he shouts at him, “Here no one
else can gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m going now to
close it. 105
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